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RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CGIAR CENTRES AND NATIONAL RESEARCH SYSTEMS: 
ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
SUMMARY 
This paper outlines current CGIAR policy on relationships between the Centres and 
national research systems and draws attention to the broader context in which the problems of 
strengthening national research capacity must be set. It distinguishes between two ways in which 
international organizations can contribute to strengthening national research systems. One, 
defined as “catalytic assistance”, depends on strengthening relationships among institutions and 
thereby contributing to institution-building. The other, defined as “research assistance”, involves 
direct assistance in the form of expertise and funding. The paper regards the former as a natural 
function of the. CGIAR Centres and the latter as being more controversial. 
It suggests three options for administering research assistance in association with Centre 
activities: 
by the Centres in a strictly limited manner; 
by the Centres through separately funded research assistance units; and 
by closer collaboration with development agencies or regional organizations. 
Expression of Group preferences on these options is sought as a basis for formulating 
policy and for planning future strategies in greater detail. 
The paper then looks at the possibilities for involving national research systems in 
international research to a greater extent than at present, and analyses the implications of 
undertaking a greater proportion of research funded by the CGIAR on a cooperative or contractual 
basis. It calls for a policy decision by the Group on whether or not there should be affirmative 
action in these respects. 
Finally, it discusses the role of Centres with ecoregional mandates in helping to orchestrate 
CGIAR activities and, in this connection, raises the issue of ISNAR’s future role within the 
System. 
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BACKGROUND 
1. Purnose of the Paoer 
Much of the discussion surrounding the proposed expansion of the CGIAR has had 
implications for the System’s priorities and strategies, on which TAC will be submitting a draft 
paper in October, 1991. However, at ICW 90, the Group asked TAC to elaborate its views on a 
number of key issues. In particular, several participants emphasized that strengthening national 
research systems could not be viewed as of secondary importance and that, in this context, the 
relationships between the CGIAR Centres and the national systems should be more explicitly 
discussed. 
This paper forms the first part of TAC’s response to the Group’s request. The 
second part will be in the form of a policy statement to be included in the priorities and strategies 
paper. It could also be published as a separate document if the Group so desired. The present 
paper is written in the form of “issues and options” in order that views expressed by the Group at 
its mid-term meeting can be taken folly into account in preparing the policy statement. 
2. Current CGIAR Policy 
Currently, there is no comprehensive statement of CGIAR policy on the relationships 
between CGIAR Centres and national research systems in the developing countries. The policies 
applied by TAC in assessing Centre programmes and budgets are based on the series of policy 
documents that have come before the Group from time to time. Among these, the most relevant 
in the present context are the First Review of the CGIAR (1976), the Second Review of the 
CGIAR (1981), and the TAC paper on Future Priorities and Strategies (1986). 
These documents are consistent in that they regard the CGIAR institutions, with the 
exception of ISNAR and IBPGR, as being primarily research institutions, but with additional roles 
in closely related aspects of training, information services and, in some instances, the 
dissemination of germplasm. They are also consistent in recommending that the Centres shouid 
not become directly involved in national research programmes, except when there is a clear need 
to do so, on a selective basis, in order to fulfil their mandates. For example, Centres have worked 
closely with national programmes in order to validate potentially important results, or as part of 
the process of developing new methodologies. They have been discouraged, however, from 
undertaking research specifically on behalf of national programmes. 
None of these earlier documents has penetrated deeply into such questions as the extent to 
which Centres should or should not become involved in measures designed to strengthen national 
research systems. Nor have they discussed in detail the extent to which international research 
funded by the CGIAR might be undertaken by the national systems themselves, rather than by the 
Centres. 
3. The Broader Context 
Any discussion of the role of the CGIAR Centres in strengthening national research 
capacities has to be seen in the broader context of all the other factors involved. It must also take 
into account the contributions made by other external agencies. Within this broad array of other 
considerations and other actors, the CGIAR contribution can concentrate only on those aspects that 
its institutions are best equipped to tackle, recognizing that this will imply being selective in the 
use of the System’s limited resources. 
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The great diversity among national research systems has also to be kept constantly in 
mind. The term national research sys:em is used in this paper to include all those institutiqns in 
the public and private sectors, including universities, that are potentially capable of contributing 
to research related to the development of agriculture, forestry and fisheries. They vary greatly in 
their strengths and weaknesses in a multiplicity of ways and for a wide variety of reasons. 
At the governmental level, they may be affected by such considerations as political 
instability, or an adverse policy environment. Their research capacity may suffer from 
deficiencies such as an insufficient number of trained scientists, the quality of their education, or 
the effectiveness of their leadership. The suitability of the environment to engender productive 
research may also vary enormously. Research may be inhibited by deficiencies such as a lack of 
adequate research facilities, lack of access to information, lack of prospects for career 
development, or unstable budgetary support. 
Amidst this array of potential weaknesses, to describe some national research systems as 
“weak” and others as “strong” could have many different meanings. In this paper, the terms 
“stronger” and “weaker” are used in a very general sense to imply that the stronger are more 
likely, and the weaker less likely, to deliver a -worthwhile research output, whatever the causes 
might be. 
The existence of so many factors that poter;tially limit the strengths of national research 
systems, however, calls for analyses that reach far cdyond the scope of this paper and policies that 
extend beyond the activities funded by the CGIAR. It might well be that the CGIAR is the most 
suitable forum in which these broader issues might, at some future date, be discussed. This paper 
is limited, however, to an analysis of a few key issues, the resolution of which is crucial for 
charting the future course of CGIAR activities. 
IssuEs AND OPTIONS 
4. International Research 
International research is central to the activities supported by the CGIAR. Originally, the. 
Centres ~concentrated on applied research designed to solve problems of wide applicability that 
were unlikely to be solved by developing countries on their own, in time to avert the threat of 
widespread hunger and deprivation. To concentrate the effort into a critical mass for each of a 
reiatively small number of research areas was considered to be a more cost-effective use of 
resources than to spread them thinly over a wide range of institutions and problems. 
During the thirty years that have elapsed since the first Centre became operational, 
however, there has been a major shift in circumstances and opinions. The research 
agenda has become much broader. Technological innovations have proved to be less widely 
applicable, or less easily adopted, than those -originally developed for wheat and rice. 
Notwithstanding their diversity, the national research systems have gradually become stronger; 
and greater ease of communication, has made it feasible to link scientists and institutions in 
networks and so derive benefits comparable to those associated with the concept of a critical mass. 
The Centres have responded to these changes in several ways. They have progressively 
adjusted their training programmes to meet the changing needs of national research systems. They 
have been heavily involved in decentralizing their activities and assisting national systems to do 
adaptive research. They have been active in promoting networks that exploit the 
P . 
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complementarities of national systems to do applied research; and they have increasingly changed 
the emphasis of their own programmes to do more strategic research to back-stop the research 
undertaken by national systems. 
These changes have been accompanied by gradual changes in the ways in which donors 
provide funding for Centre activities. The use of bilateral funding for supporting Centre 
collaboration with national programmes has had the advantage of tapping sources of funding that 
would not otherwise have been available. It has also raised questions, however, of the extent to 
which Centres might reasonably be involved in providing direct support to national systems and in 
acting as implementing agencies for bilaterally funded projects. 
Many of the issues that have arisen as a consequence of these changes have become even 
more prominent in discussing the expansion of the CGIAR. The issues are complex and 
interrelated, but most of them are captured in the following two questions: 
What should be the role of the CGIAR institutions in strengthening national research 
systems? 
What is the most cost-effective, way of conducting international research? 
Answers to both questions require thorough analysis of the relationships between the 
CGIAR institutions and national research systems. 
5. Strengthening National Research Svstems 
5.1. The Soecial Role of ISNAR 
Recognizing that limited capacity in national research systems was one of the key factors 
limiting their use of Centre outputs, the CGIAR created ISNAR in 1979. ISNAR assists 
developing countries to define their research goals and to increase their efficiency in achieving 
them. It aims to do so through enhancing their capacity to formulate policies and helping them to 
improve the organization and management of their research institutions. Its activities are divid-&l 
into three closely interrelated programmes: advisory services, research, and training. 
ISNAR is currently revising its strategy and undergoing an external review, the report of 
which will be presented to the CGIAR in 199,. 3 Issues which the Review Panel has been 
asked to consider include: 
the extent to which ISNAR might become involved in helping to coordinate the financial 
contributions of the donor community in sofar as they relate to strengthening national 
research systems; 
ways in which ISNAR might collaborate more closely with other CGIAR institutions in 
strengthening national systems; and 
the relationships between ISNAR and development agencies, such as FAO, and its 
relationships with regional organizations that also deal with research management and 
policy. 
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These issues and others that have been raised from time to time, such as whether ISNAR 
might assist in implementing the recommendations arising from its country review missions, are 
clearly germane to the substance of this paper. Indeed, no discussion of the role of the CGIAR in 
strengthening national research systems could possibly be complete without 
reflecting on ISNAR’s future strategy. 
While this paper focuses mainly on the other CGIAR Centres, some possibilities for 
additional ISNAR activities are alluded to later in the paper (Section 9). A more substantive 
discussion of ISNAR’s future strategy might reasonably await the report of the external review 
and ISNAR’s revised strategic plan. ISNAR’s own view of its current role is given in greater 
detail in Appendix I. 
5.2. The Role of the other CGIAR Centres in Strengtheninp National Research Svstems 
Individual scientists and research institutions collaborate in many different ways to 
undertake research. Any of these relationships can also involve an international 
organization, or a donor agency, not in the role of research, but in a facilitating or strengthening 
role. Because of the involvement of Centres in roles of this type, we have to distinguish among 
several different, but interrelated types of activity, some of which might be regarded as entirely 
legitimate for CGIAR Centres and others that have proved more controversial. 
First, we can usefully distinguish between strengthening the relationships among the 
participants in collaborative research, and strengthening the research capacity of one or more of 
them, Examples of strengthening relationships in research may be seen in the ways in which 
many different international organizations seek to fuifil their mandates. 
For example, most of the organizations operating under the auspices of the International 
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) function in this way. Typically, an ICSU organization acts 
as a catalyst to collaborative research by convening symposia, paying travel expenses, assisting to 
publish proceedings of conferences and, generally, encouraging or strengthening the relationships 
among the participants. The CGIAR Centres do likewise for the networks they support. To 
function effectively in these roles, the Centres have often outposted staff members to regional 
offices to act as liaison scientists, and in coordinating and consultancy roles. . 
Let us define this type of assistance as “catalytic assistance” - aimed at increasing the 
output through stimulating the reaction, rather than by augmenting one of the reagents. 
Strengthening the relationships among scientists and institutions in developing countries, and 
between them and the Centres, through catalytic assistance, has an important institution-building 
function. Through increasing the interaction among scientists with different backgrounds of 
experience, it helps to generate and diffuse new ideas, to give greater impetus and relevance to 
research programmes, and to keep scientists informed of new techniques and methodologies. In 
these respects, catalytic assistance can make important contributions to strengthening national 
research capacity. 
Having defined this type of assistance as “catalytic”, we must distinguish it clearly from 
other forms of assistance designed to augment national research capacity more directly. In 
practice, this type of assistance to national re&rch systems comprises various forms of technical 
and financial assistance. 
Most donors define technical assistance (or technical cooperation) as the provision of 
expertise that is a substitute for national expertise. It is sometimes difficult, however, to 
distinguish clearly between substituting for national expertise in a “technical assistance” role and 
working with national scientists in an “institution-building” role. In general, outposted Centre 
, 1 
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scientists are regarded as fulfilling an institution-building role when they work with a group of 
countries, rather than with a single country. Working with individual countries on a strictly 
temporary or consultancy basis can also be regarded as a contribution to institution-building, 
especially if training or scientific exchange is involved. 
Financial assistance, in the context of this paper, includes capital grants for laboratories, 
equipment, vehicles etc., as well as any funding designed to supplement the normal research 
budget of a developing country, or the emoluments of its staff. To keep the terminology as 
simple as possible, we use the term “research assistance” to include technical assistance, financial 
assistance, or any combination of the two, and use other terms only when it is essential for 
clarity. 
“Research assistance”, thus defined, is central to the issues discussed in this paper, 
because much of the controversy surrounding what the CGIAR Centres should or should not do 
hinges on the extent to which they should become involved in the provision of research assistance, 
or its administration within bilateral projects. Although research assistance gives direct 
strengthening to national research capacity, it does not necessarily do so on a sustainable basis. 
As research institutions, the CGIAR Centres might be expected to make their main 
contributions to strengthening national research systems through scientific collaboration, 
and by providing the outputs of their work in the form of information and improved genetic 
material. As they were created to serve the needs of developing countries, however, they would 
also be expected to contribute to iirstitution-building&rough training and other activities. 
Their training activities would be expected to extend well beyond those associated with 
post-graduate degrees into specialized training courses for scientists at all stages in their careers, 
and to reflect changing needs and perspectives. They would also be expected to provide catalytic 
assistance to strengthen collaboration among scientists and institutions in every way that is 
possible and appropriate. Some or all of these activities might also involve the outposting of 
Centre scientists to work with groups of countries in the most important regions served by that 
particular Centre. All of these functions of the Centres are largely uncontroversial and are not 
discussed further in this paper, except to recognize their relevance in a range of different contexts. 
None of the above measures can be effective, however, unless there is a certain minimum 
capacity within the national system to do research, as well as to establish effective linkages both 
with the Centres and with local producers through the extension services. Where this minimum 
capacity is lacking, the Centres have sometimes collaborated with bilateral donors in the provision 
of research assistance, rather than face the frustration of not being able to transfer the benefits of 
their work. 
The issue of strengthening national research systems is very much broader, however, than 
finding appropriate mechanisms for administering research assistance. It involves all the 
considerations with which ISNAR and IFF%I, among many others, are especially concerned. Only 
the Group, itself, can determine the role it wishes to play in this whole area of activity. In 
particular, it must enunciate its preferences for the extent to which the Centres it funds Should 
become involved in direct support for national systems, and the ways in which they might do so. 
Before considering options, however, there are other aspects of Centre relationships with national 
systems that have to be taken into account, because of their potential for contributing to 
international research. 
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6. Alternative Wavs of Conductinp International Research 
The Centres are especially suited for doing those types of international research that 
require a relatively large group of experienced scientists working under ecological and 
so&-economic conditions of wide importance to developing countries. In contrast, some 
international research, in molecular biology for example, might be more efficiently done by 
contracting it to advanced institutions anywhere in the world. 
There is increasing scope, however, for contributing to international research through 
collaboration among the stronger national systems, and between them and the Centres. Although 
existing Centres already have considerable experience in these respects, it is open to question 
whether this approach is being exploited to its full potential, There is a need to explore additional 
ways of harnessing the growing strengths of national systems to work for the common good. 
In order to do so, there must be an agreed framework within which priorities can be 
widely agreed, different types of collaboration explored, and funding mobilized. To consider 
some of the possibilities in greater depth, however, it is first necessary to analyse different types 
of collaboration and how they relate to sources of funding. 
6.1. Tvnes of Collaboration 
In any research relationship, whether between scientists or institutions, two of the 
fundamental considerations are: (i) “who calls the tune?” (i.e. who determines the aims of the 
research or defines the priorities); and (ii) “who pays?” (essentially, who provides the ftnancial 
resources and through what channels). 
In the continuum of possible relationships between two hypothetical institutions, “A” and 
“B”, we see two extremes. In one, the aims of the research are mutually agreed by “A” and “B”. 
They share the work; they fund their own participation; they share the results; and there is no net 
flow of financial resources, either from “A” to “B”, or from “B” to “A”. We define this type of 
relationship as “cooperative”. 
At the other extreme, “A” determines what the aims of the work should be and pays “B” 
to do it. This we call “contract” research, or a “contractual” relationship. In this relationship, 
“B” is usually described as the contractor (the one who does the work) and “A” the customer (the 
one for whom the work is done). If both “A” and “B” are research institutions, “A” could 
equally be a contractor for “B”. 
Clearly, there are many variations between these two extremes in the ways in which 
institutions collaborate with one another and we use the term “collaboration” in this general sense. 
Where these collaborative arrangements are neither wholly cooperative or wholly contractual, they 
usually contain elements of both. We can get a long way in analyzing the issues, therefore, if we 
think in terms of these two basic components, summarized thus: 
“cooperative research” - involves mutually agreeing the aims and sharing the costs; 
“contract research” - one party defines the aims and pays the costs. 
These terms can also be used when several institutions are linked in a networking mode. 
The relationships can be described as cooperative, when the participants jointly 
define the aims and share the costs, or contractual, when a “customer” determines the aims and 
pays the other institutions to do the work. The customer could be a single institution or a group 
of institutions working collaboratively. Moreover, all these relationships can be further analyzed 
taking into account the two types of assistance already identified (section 5.2) namely: 
c 
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“cataIytic assistance” - designed to strengthen relationships and thereby contribute to 
institution-building, and 
“research assistance” - designed to strengthen national research capacity more directly. 
6.2. w 
The motivation for cooperative research is primarily one of self interest, Individual 
scientists or institutions agree to participate so that the results of their own research can be 
interpreted within a broader context. For example, in the general fields of research in agriculture, 
agroforesty and forestry, the results of experiments are greatly influenced by seasonal conditions. 
Instead of attempting to validate results by repeating experiments over a large number of seasons, 
the experiments can be replicated over a broad geographical area, chosen so that the spatial 
variation in environment in one season is likely to simulate the temporal variation encountered at 
any one location over many seasons. 
Although the results of each individual experiment are location specific, the conclusions 
can be generalized through pooling the results of all the experiments. Indeed, 
cooperative research of this type often includes research at three levels. For example, a group of 
countries might cooperate to evaluate their own varieties in a set of variety trials conducted in 
each country. In this instance, there will be a strong element of adaptive research in estimating 
the performance of the varieties at any single location; there will be an element of applied 
research in calculating the stability of the varieties over all locations; and there may be an element 
of strategic research in developing new mathematical models for estimating stability. Likewise, in 
many aspects of research on resource management, or production systems, the three levels of 
research are often represented in a set of experiments conducted cooperatively. 
In the developed countries, cooperative research of this type may involve organizations in 
both the public and private sectors. It is often organized under the auspices of an international 
organization or scientific society, and may involve no external input of funding whatever. 
Frequently, all the participants fund their own attendance at meetings and share the organizational 
and analytical work among themselves. In other instances, catalytic assistance may be provided 
by the organization acting as the umbrella for the cooperation. 
In the developing countries, only a small proportion of research institutions could muster 
the financial resources to operate without the external injection of, at least, catalytic assistance. In 
many instances, however, even the provision of catalytic assistance would not be enough. There 
might well be many national institutions which would like to participate but could not do so 
without some additional funding, defined here as research assistance. 
In section 5.2 we saw that research assistance might be necessary to enable a national 
research system to make use of the outputs of a Centre. Here, we recognize that research 
assistance might be necessary to enable a national system to participate in cooperative research. 
Similar considerations might also apply to contract research. 
6.3. Contract Research 
The main advantage of contract research is that it provides a means of exploiting 
specialized capabilities or special circumstances and, consequently, of doing research in a 
cost-effective manner. In the context of the CGIAR, the principle of contracting to institutions, in 
both the developed and developing countries, has already been applied by the Centres to take 
advantage of any special skills, or particular environmental conditions within a national system 
that could be used to further the purpose of the international programme. 
J 
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With respect to the developing countries, such contracts provide opportunities for making 
use of well-trained personnel, giving them greater motivation and helping generally to strengthen 
national research capabilities. The direct costs involved might be less than would be involved in 
doing the work at an international Centre, but the administrative costs of awarding contracts, 
monitoring their progress, and evaluating their success tend to be high, especially when large 
numbers of small contracts are involved. 
Another disadvantage is that contract research precludes the involvement of the weaker 
national systems. Even those with well-trained scientists might not be able to 
undertake contracts because of the lack of basic facilities for laboratory or field research. 
Consequently, many potentially important institutions in terms of the ecosystems they represent, 
might be excluded from undertaking contracts unless they could also be provided 
with research assistance. 
6.4. Imolications for the Future 
The foregoing analysis highlights several issues. It raises questions of linking 
international research more closely to research assistance when required to enable the weaker 
national research systems to benefit in several different ways. Research assistance may be 
necessary to enable them to use the outputs of the Centres, to participate in cooperative research 
activities, or to undertake contract research. 
It also raises the question of the relative importance that the CGIAR should attach to 
different mechanisms for conducting international research. Cooperative research requires 
well-funded national systems. Contract research targets the institutions or individuals best suited 
to undertake the work. Both are complementary to the evolving concepts of global and 
ecoregional activities, as well as to the increasing focus of Centre programmes on strategic 
research. 
7. Linking Centre Activities to Research Assistance 
Although there is general recognition of the need for research assistance to national 
institutions to reinforce Centre activities, a recurring issue in the CGIAR has been the extent to 
which the Centres themselves should become involved in providing and administering it. In the 
past, even when Centre involvement in research assistance has been considered to be legitimate, 
there has been some uncertainty about the criteria that should be applied for limiting its scale and 
for ensuring a sense of equity in the way it is disbursed among recipient institutions. 
These issues were analyzed in both the First and Second Reviews of the CGIAR, but they 
have continued to cause misunderstanding and controversy. Some further clarification is therefore 
necessary in order to identify the choices that need to be made before the CGIAR’s future policy 
on these matters can be formulated. 
Many of the important considerations relating to research assistance are implicit in the 
following two questions: 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of Centre involvement in research assistance? 
What mechanisms should be adopted by the CGIAR for the provision and administration 
of development assistance linked to the work of its own institutions? 
l 
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7.1. Involvement of Centres in Research Assistance 
One of the main advantages of Centre involvement in research assistance is that it permits 
the Centre to extend its working relationships to a greater number of developing countries, thus 
facilitating the transfer of its technology and giving valuable feedback to its research programmer. 
Moreover, Centre staff are motivated by the opportunities provided for greater impact of their 
work. These are some of the justifications that Centres offer for becoming involved in activities 
that might otherwise be regarded as the role of development agencies, not of research institutions. 
There may also be significant budgetary advantages to the Centre, in that some of the 
work it might otherwise commission from its core budget can be supplemented through what is 
essentially a research assistance project. There have been many examples of Centres achieving 
wider evaluation of their genetic material in this way, or of testing and developing new practices 
or production systems. 
There have undoubtedly been numerous occasions when involvement of Centres in 
research assistance derived from bilateral funding has benefited both the Centre’s research 
programme and the national systems, but there are also dangers in these relationships that tend to 
become greater as the Centre’s involvement in them increases. Indeed, over- involvement in 
bilateral projects, whether with individual countries or in a networking mode, can have distorting 
effects on both the Centre and the national systems. 
For example, staff appointed as international scientists may have their productivity eroded 
through heavy routine administration. Pressure from individual donors to implement particular 
projects may distort the Centre’s priorities. A Centre might seek participation in bilateral projects 
primarily to increase its budget or to achieve impact. This could distort the priorities of the 
developing country. Centres can become over-committed,~resulting in the recruitment of staff for 
technical assistance, who have little more experience than the national scientists, and do not 
command their respect. In one or more of these ways, the credibility of the Centre might be 
undermined. 
Although all Centre involvement in bilateral projects now comes under the scrutiny of 
TAC, it has been difficult for TAC to make adjustments to those projects that have already been 
agreed. Furthermore, from the donor’s point of view, these grants are not fungible. To reject 
them would therefore mean depriving the’developing countries of badly needed resources to 
strengthen their national research systems. Even classifying the projects as “complementary” and 
not “core” may cause problems for both the donors and the Centres. There is a limit, therefore, 
to the extent to which TAC can prevent the distortion of priorities, unless it were to take a more 
hardnosed attitude, which might well be regarded as unnecessarily obstructive by all concerned. 
From the donor’s point of view, implementation of the research component of a bilateral 
development project by a Centre might present the easiest option. As well as being 
best placed to provide the technical input, Centres are often better placed than donor agencies to 
recruit personnel for techniql assistance and to provide them with logistical 
support. 
It might also be easier for the Centre to administer the funding. Indeed, for some donors 
this may be the only viable option. While some donors have mechanisms for 
administering small grants, either through their own technical assistance activities, or through their 
embassies or high commissions. Others, apparently, have not. Some find it particularly difficult 
to administer the small amounts of funding involved for each participating country in a networking 
activity. This is one of the reasons why they call on the Centres to do it for them. 
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However, the administration of bilateral projects carries overhead costs which the Centres 
have not always fully recovered from the bilateral donor. Consequently, to a greater or lesser 
extent, such costs represent a drain on the Centre’s core funding, which may be seen by other 
donors as inappropriate. 
The dangers outlined above arise primarily when the Centre responsible for a given area 
of research, also provides the research assistance needed for the wider involvement of national 
systems in those same areas of research. Instead of responding to demand, there is a 
temptation for Centres to promote their own areas of research, and for countries to look upon the 
Centres as donor agencies, rather than as research institutions. This would argue for the 
administration of research assistance to be separated from the research activities, themselves. 
7.2. QDtons i 
Centre boards have defined their own criteria by which they limit Centre involvement in 
research assistance. The actual extent of involvement has varied both among Centres and over 
time. It has depended partly on perceptions of what is necessary to fulfil the Centre’s 
mandate, and partly on the attitudes of donors. If the Centres are to operate primarily as research 
institutions in future, however, they will have to continue to limit their involvement in research 
assistance and, to achieve this, they will be heavily dependent on their donors exercising restraint. 
This is one option. It might be regarded as the status quo option but, in reality, it would 
require extensive revision of the programmer of some of the Centres. Some of the established 
Centres and some of the newly-admitted or proposed ones are either more heavily involved, or 
projected to be more heavily involved, in research assistance than would be consistent with the 
policy outlined above. 
Recent discussions at Group meetings, however, have cast doubt on the extent to which 
donors wish Centre activities to be limited in this way. While TAC has frequently advocated 
regarding the Centres primarily as res&ch institutions, only the donors can decide their future. 
If there is a desire to link Centre activities more closely to research assistance, an alternative 
approach would be to give more explicit recognition to this need, and to modify the structure of 
some or all of the Centres accordingly. 
A second option would therefore be to establish a research assistance agency as a separate 
unit at some or all of the Centres. It could come under the control of the Centre board but have a 
separate budget and be entirely self-funding, by charging appropriate overhead costs on all the 
research assistance it administered. The research assistance could then be managed by full-time 
specialists, instead of by international scientists on a part-time basis, as often happens at present. 
The research assistance unit could draw on Centre programme staff on a paid consultancy 
basis, thus maintaining the integrity of the core funding. Some restructuring of existing Centres 
along these lines would not be difficult. In some instances, it would amount to little more than 
re-organizing the units that already exist at some Centres, which currently operate under such 
titles as “international cooperation programmes”. 
A third option would be to explore more actively the possibilities of working in 
collaboration with other organizations, such as development agencies and regional organizations. 
There are some precedents for this general mode of operation. For example, although IBPGR is a 
special case among CGIAR institutions in that -it has been administratively part of FAO, its 
financial assistance to developing countries has traditionally been administered through the FAO 
regional offices, thus relieving IBPGR scientists of these responsibilities. 
325 
These three options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. All of them might have a 
place in certain circumstances. It is important, however that the Group’s preferences should be 
clearly understood so that appropriate policies can be formulated and strategies planned. 
Successful international research is entirely dependent on the strengths of the institutions 
that participate in doing it, regardless of whether they are nationally or 
internationally constituted. Moreover, adoption of the results is primarily dependent on the 
strengths of the national research and extension systems. Involving national systems in 
international research is attractive because it potentially offers opportunities both for contributing 
to the aims of the international research and of simultaneously strengthening the national 
institutions. ‘Success in either respect is heavily dependent, however, on strong research 
leadership and adequate mechanisms for monitoring progress. It is also dependent on the 
countries wanting to devote some of their staff to international research which, in the national 
context, might not be of highest priority. 
In moving into new areas of research, such as forestry, and giving greater emphasis to 
other aspects of research, such as resource management, the CGIAR is in a strong position to 
build on the experience already gained in collaborative research with national research systems. 
The main issues relate to the extent to which the CGIAR should attempt to meet its goals through 
promoting research in national and regional institutions, as distinct from doing it in its own 
institutions. 
One option would be to do more research through cooperative networks. As we have 
seen, however, to involve developing countries more widely in cooperative research would be 
dependent not only on the provision of catalytic assistance, which the Centres are well- equipped 
to do, but also on linking the research more closely to research assistance, which they are less 
well-equipped to do under their present structures. A prerequisite to giving greater emphasis to 
this option within the CGIAR System, therefore, would be the formulation of a definitive CGIAR 
policy on the provision and administration of research assistance. 
Another, but not mutually exclusive, option would be to do more research through 
contracting to national systems in the developing countries. Contracts could either be restricted to 
those institutions that already have the capacity to undertake them; or they could be extended to 
institutions that would require some additional research assistance. 
As far as the administration of contracts is concerned, some re-organization would be 
necessary for those Centres not already involved to a significant extent in this type of activity. 
Moreover, additional thought would have to be given to various other implications of a move in 
this direction, such as the mechanisms for determining priorities for contract research, equitable 
ways of awarding contracts, and the need to avoid overloading national systems with work that 
might not conform to their own, national priorities. 
The experience already gained by the Centres in these respects could be used as a basis 
for formulating more detailed strategies for affirmative action on contract research, should this be 
the Group’s wish. For example, IRRI has recently devoted a great deal of thought to the principle 
of forming “research consortia”. IRRI defines a consortium as “a limited number of national and 
international institutions formally organized to collaborate in research, training and technology 
generation designed to meet mutually agreed objectives”. It thus falls broadly into the category of 
cooperative research as defined in this paper. Built into it, however, is a component of contract 
research for carefully identified projects at key sites, from which the results will have regional or 
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global significance. The work will be guided by a steering committee, with IRRI providing a 
coordiitor and sometimes, but not always, seeking the funding and administering it jointly with 
the participating members. 
All of these options for future ways of conducting international research, as well as for 
providing research assistance, apply not only to the work of existing CGIAR Centres, but also to 
those under consideration for the future, including a new institution for forestry. They also have 
implications for the evolving concepts of global and ecoregional activities. Before future 
strategies can be planned in detail, therefore, there must be a stronger CGIAR consensus on the 
direction of Mure policy in these respects. Some consideration must also be given to the growing 
complexity of CGIAR operations as viewed from the standpoint of the national systems. 
9. The Need for Orchestration of CGIAR Activities 
9.1. The Nature of the Problems 
From the viewpoint of the national system seeking help, the number of Centres operating 
in a single region may be a source of confusion. Which Centre does it approach for help on 
research with a farming systems perspective, for example, the design and analysis of field 
experiments? Any of the commodity Centres or resource-management centres could 
help with these problems, or with a wide range of similar, non-specific problems. The country 
might well not know which Centre to approach and there might even be competition among the 
Centres for an invitation to work with the country concerned. 
Another problem is the need to avoid placing too great a burden on national systems, 
through independent approaches made to the same institution by several Centres. This 
problem has been raised many times, especially in the context of Africa. It is partly associated 
with the number of networks being created and partly with the opportunities the national 
programmes now have for receiving development assistance. 
As a consequence, the increasing calls on the time of national scientists are not necessarily 
determined by their own national priorities. The driving force may be supply, 
rather than demand. Furthermore, active promotion of cooperative and contract research by the 
Centres might serve only to aggravate the problem, unless it is recognized and avoided. 
As far as cooperative networks are concerned, if they are to be successful and sustainable, 
there is no viable alternative to a demand-driven system in which the countries 
themselves define the problems and determine the priorities. It is the orchestration of CGIAR 
invoivement in all these activities to which further thought must be given and 
appropriate action taken. 
9.2. The Ecoregional Concent 
The concept of ecoregional activities has been developed partly to meet these needs. 
Although many of the operational details have still to be worked out, it is envisaged that Centres 
with ecoregional responsibilities would thoroughly get to know and understand the needs and 
priorities of the countries in the region they serve. They would work towards a set of 
relationships in which priorities for collaboration with national research systems would be 
determined by regional or sub-regional associations of countries, institutions, or scientists, 
organized either under the umbrella of a political entity, or through an officially-approved steering 
committee. 
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Contractual relationships required to fulfil the research requirements of either an 
ecoregional mandate, or a commodity mandate, could be facilitated by the same consultative 
procedures and so avoid a conflict of priorities. Programmes of research assistance would 
likewise be tuned to national priorities and administered according to agreed CGIAR policy. 
Through its close relationships with the countries in the region, the Centre with the 
ecoregional mandate would automatically become the lead Centre for CGIAR collaboration 
with national systems. Other Centres would be encouraged to work closely with it, primarily 
because this would become the easiest route for working with the national systems, not because 
the other Centres would have to submit to being “coordinated” by it. Ultimately, coordination will 
be achieved only through the developing countries, themselves, by integrating their “demands” 
from the multiple sources available, including those lying outside the CGIAR family. 
If the CGIAR wishes some of its Centres to become more explicitly involved in research 
assistance, those with ecoregional mandates would be prime candidates for assuming 
this role. It would also be easy for them to administer any research assistance in the region 
associated with the programmes of Centres with global commodity mandates, since the intention is 
that they would act as hosts for outposted staff from these Centres. 
With the further development of these and other ideas on ecoregional activities it may also 
be desirable to re-consider ISNAR’s role within the CGIAR System. ISNAR’s original mandate 
envisaged two functions in addition to those in which it is now primarily engaged. One was for it 
to act as an “honest broker” to put national systems in touch with donors, and the other was to 
help in linking the Centres more closely to national research systems. Whether ISNAR broadens 
its current mandate or not, there is clearly a case for it to keep closely in touch with the 
ecoregional concept and to consider opportunities for its operational involvement in this type of 
activity. 
10. Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to clarify key issues on which there has been some confusion in 
the past. In doing so it presents some hard choices for the CGIAR. It will not be 
possible to develop detailed strategies for the future, however, unless the Group can form a strong 
consensus on what its policy on these issues should be. 
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APPENDIX I 
ISNAR’S OWN VIEW OF ITS CURRENT ROLE 
ISNAR has always had a complex mandate which has made it difficult to get consensus on 
its role. Among its functions it has: 
Generation of knowledge about the state of NARS and the way they function. 
Development and adaptation of management tools for strengthening NARS. 
System-building in NARS . 
As one moves from the first to the third category, one moves from the production of 
“public goods” to the production of “private goods”. The production of knowledge about NARS 
is available to all those who are interested in strengthening them, and the use of that knowledge 
by one does not detract from the ability of others to use it as well. This is an appropriate activity 
of an institute in a research system. The application of that knowledge in the development and 
adaptation of management concepts, tools, and approaches has both public and private goods 
aspects. The system strengthening that goes on in a collaborating NARS is private in the sense 
that ISNAR staff can only work in one country at a time, even though the lessons and approaches 
are later adapted for others. Once the tools are more generally available, the provision of 
advisory services to particular NARS is characteristic of good technical assistance: it addresses 
priorities of particular systems and builds capacity in the country, but it is private in the sense that 
the benefit is immediately felt by the NARS in question. 
We have noted in our present strategy and medium-term plan documents that ISNAR must 
be involved to some degree in all three types of functions to fulfill its mandate. The problem is 
that donors with different agendas would like to see an ISNAR with different mixes of these 
activities. Since our relations with NARS, as well as with donors, are different in the 
performance of each of these functions it is not surprising that there are some difficulties 
interpreting our mandate. 
There are different roles that have been seen for ISNAR. Our basic operating principle 
has been that ISNAR works through NARS to help them to become more efficient and more 
effective, to develop the capacity and the processes to set priorities and make choices, including 
choices among sources of technical and financial assistance. 
Broker between donors and NARS (or, in the extreme coordinator of donor assistance to 
NARS). Given the complexity of the coordinating task described above, there was no 
opposition to the decision to remove the broker function from the ISNAR constitution. 
Execution of technical assistance projects. While ISNAR has a comparative advantage in 
cooperating on issues of policy, organization and management, it does not have a 
comparative advantage in the execution of complex system/building projects., ISNAR has 
taken a very cautious approach to engaging in pure technical assistance activities. 
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First, there are other organizations that have the necessary critical mass and that are better 
set up administratively and legally to provide technical assistance, personnel and .backstop 
them in the field. Second, ISNAR’s cooperation with the NARS through partnership is at 
a policy level, higher than that reached by the normal technical assistance expert or 
consultant in an executing role. (ISNAR excludes the taking of line positions in a NARS.) 
Finally, with a small staff, our multiplier is greater if we keep our specialists available for 
a wider range of functions and countries. 
Intermediary between NARS and IARCs. Our basic principle has been that it is not in the 
interests of the NARS to have an ISNAR which is perceived as the broker of IARC 
activities. If ISNAR is doing its job in strengthening NARS they are able to do this for 
themselves; if ISFAR assistance is required, it cannot be perceived as the representative of 
IARC interests versus other institutions capable of assisting NARS. ISNAR must remain 
an “honest broker”. However, we are looking at ways and means to assist IARCs in 
becoming more effective in their relationship with NARS. 
The above comments go beyond the needs of the paper at hand and anticipate further 
discussions of these issues. However, we felt they were relevant points that highlight these issues 
also for the external review and for the CGIAR strategy and priorities exercise. 
* 
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Exoansion of the Svstem 
Extract from “Summary of Proceedings and Decisions” 
CGIAR Mid-Term Meeting held in Paris, Fran= on 21-23 May 1991 
At ICWYO, the Groups decided to expand and restructure the CGIAR system, in terms of 
research themes as well aS the inclusion of additional centres. Several agenda items at the May 1991 
Mid-Term Meeting followed on from those decisions. 
The Group endorsed proposals for further expansion - as, for instance, in agroforestry/forestry 
research - but placed on record the need to examine medium-term funding prospects and their 
implications more closely. 
Several references were made to the funding situation in open session. Funding problems 
were described more starkly at informal discussions where some delegates reported on the difficulties 
they face in protecting contributions to the CGIAR from their institutions. 
The need to redeploy the system’s resources, so that new directions could be taken in research 
programmer, was stated by many donors, but no particular set of prescriptions was endorsed. 
Ecoregional Mechanisms 
Mr. McCalla introduced a TAC report on an ecoregional approach to research, prepared in 
response to requests from donors. 
In their consideration of systemic restructuring at ICWYO, the Group endorsed a 
recommendation from TAC that in a restructured system, CGIAR-supported research should fall into 
two clusters: global activities and ecoregional activities. 
The Groups asked, however, for a TAC report elaborating on the nature of ecoregional 
activities and the mechanisms by which they would be carried out. The message he heard when the 
matter was previously discussed, Mr. ‘Ihalwitx told the Mid-Term Meeting, was “it seems like a good 
idea, but we don’t know exactly what it means”. 
The TAC report submitted to the Mid-Term Meeting was meant to fill that gap, Mr. M&alla 
indicated. It outlined the characteristics of an ecoregional approach without going into operational 
detail or questions of implementation. The next step, he said, would be for institutions in the CGIAR 
to respond as to how they might go about adopting the approach outlined by TAC. 
CIAT, in an innovative move, had already taken a first run at how its activities could be 
redefined, to bring in the ecoregional emphasis. He felt it was useful, therefore, to discuss the TAC 
report and the CIAT presentation in juxtaposition - matching precept with practice. 
TAC’s proposal was that the global research activities of the CGIAR should be complemented 
by an increase in research focussed on agroecological xones, regionally defined. TAC had coined the 
term “ecoregional” to describe such research. 
The proposed ecoregional approach provided an innovative means for expanding research on 
resource management while maintaining an emphasis on improved agricultural productivity. TAC 
believed that this approach would also improve the interactions between CGIAR cent&s and the 
NARS. 
TAC used the term resource management in a broad sense as set out by its report of 1988 on 
sustainability. Thus, “resource management” covers cultural and human resources inputs, fertilizer 
and pesticides, and natural resources. 
TAC’s examination of research on resource management was set in the context of threats to 
the sustainability of agriculture. Building on CGIAR experience, TAC felt it was now necessary to 
integrate resource management and productivity concerns, to combine human and technical 
dimensions, to adopt an integrated systems approach, and to link policy formulation with technology 
development. 
Mr. McCalla drew the Group’s attention to three characteristics of the proposed ecoregional 
approach. 
First, it would rationalize efforts made by the CGIAR to strengthen national programmes 
because it would reduce the extent to which competing demands were placed on their scarce 
resources. 
Second, TAC had proposed a fully decentralized model of research on resource management, 
and rejected the need at this time for a global coordinating mechanism or centre for research on soil, 
water, fertilizer, etc. 
Third, the model proposed would strengthen CGIAR collaboration with multilateral agencies 
as well as with advanced institutions in developing and developed countries. 
TAC recognized, Mr. McCalla said, that there were financial implications in what was 
proposed. These had not been addressed, because they could be examined as part of the consideration 
of priorities and strategies and the five-year planning horizon for resource allocation. 
Commenting on the TAC report, Mr. Thalwitz said that what was required from the Group 
was a judgement on whether the principles expounded by TAC were acceptable and should be further 
developed to dovetail with the overall agenda of CGXAR priorities and strategies. 
If that was the case, TAC could move into the next phase of outlining how the ecoregional 
approach would become operational in the CGIAR as a whole. That assessment would necessarily 
have to take funding claims and needs into account. 
A strong consensus emerged in the discussion that followed for acceptance of the ecoregional 
approach as proposed by TAC. In terms of their own experience, individual or institutional, as well 
as in terms of current realities, delegates were convinced that the CGIAR had no option but to deal 
with resource management issues. 
‘Ihe world faced a very real threat of environmental degradation, and international agricultural 
research centres were therefore obliged to build a realistic resource management emphasis into their 
research programmes. TAC’s proposal was welcomed as a move ln the correct direction. 
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While broadly endorsing TAC’s proposal, the Group cautioned that a step-by-step approach 
should be taken in this area. Some centres had dealt with resource management in the past and their 
experience should be taken into account. So should the experience of advanced institutions in member 
countries. Some of them had a substantial record of effort and achievement which could be tapped. 
The need to consult closely with NARS as the implementation process got underway was 
considered particularly important. Genuine partnership with NARS was necessary for the success of 
the ecoregional approach; 
Throughout the discussions, the point was made that the changed emphasis in research could 
not take place without a real redeployment of resources within the system. If the system could not 
bite that bullet, they could not proceed with systemic restructuring. 
Finally, Mr. Thalwitz invited further communication among all parties, so that these views 
could be woven into TAC’s further deliberations. 
Relationships with National Agricultural Research Systems (NARQ 
The Group received a TAC options paper on the principles and practices that affect and could 
shape future policy connected with relationships between CGIAR centres and national agricultural 
research systems. 
Mr. McCalla reminded the Group that the TAC paper had two origins. The fist was a 
discussion document on the subject which was discussed at the Hague Mid-Term Meeting (May 1990) 
but not brought to a conclusion. 
The second was TAC’s expectation, as stated in its paper on “Expansion of the CGIAR 
System” (ICW’90), that national systems would grow over time, thereby requiring a change in the 
role of the CGIAR. 
Discussing that proposition, donors suggested that they needed more guidance and 
information. They sought explicit proposals for action by the CGIAR and CGIAR centres to 
strengthen national systems. 
The paper prepared for the Mid-Term Meeting was the first part of TAC’s response to that 
request. In the second part, views expressed at the Mid-Term Meeting would be worked into the 
priorities and strategies paper, which TAC would present at ICw’9 1. 
If the Group so wishes, TAC could prepare a separate policy paper distilling the positions on 
which agreement was reached at the Mid-Term Meeting, but preferred the first option. 
The paper under discussion sought to clarify some of the issues that had caused confusion in 
the past, Mr. McCalla said. It outlines existing policy, indicates the broader context in which CGIAR 
policy must be set, outlined the special role of 1SNAR;and identifies key issues around ehich future 
policy must be built. 
The paper set out two forms of support to NARS: @alytic wcq, which was a for& of 
institution building; and research assistance, which involves direct assistance by way of expertise, 
funding, or both. 
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TAC considered catalvtic assistance a natural function of CGIAR centres. Research 
Bsistance, however, was controversial, giving rise to concerns about the extent to which CGIAR 
centres should become executing agencies for bilateral projects. 
The paper set out three options for administering research assistance in association with centre 
activities. These options were, first, by the centres in a strictly limited manner; second, by centres 
through a separately funded research assistance unit; or third, by closer collaboration with 
development agencies or regional organizations. 
These options were not mutually exclusive, Mr. McCalla said, but called for a consensus from 
members as the basis for future policies and action. 
The paper went on to examine possibilities for involving NARS in international research to 
a greater extent than at present. The role of CGIAR centres engaged in ecoregional work, and 
ISNAR’s future role were other key issues highlighted in the paper. 
Mr. John Walsh (Director General, ILCA), Chairman of the Centre Directors Committee, 
said that CGIAR centres were perhaps in advance of the TAC paper, both in thought and deed. 
The centres have grown to realize that prospects for their own effectiveness would be very 
poor unless they could work in partnership with strong national systems. 
The centres had, therefore, developed working relations with NARS, for instance, through 
training and by sharing information. Collaborative research was taking place, and had the potential 
for great success, Mr. Walsh said. 
Having come thus far, the question to be decided was how much further the centres should 
go. Should they, for instance, provide for participation by NARS in the governance of international 
centres? 
The centres were alive to these issues, and were pursuing them. Relations between centres 
and NARS were under constant review and subject to periodic change. 
Throughout the discussion, there was complete support for the principle that partnerships 
between CGIAR centres and NARS should be strengthened and deepened. They were both part of 
the global research system, and true complementarity between them would enhance the reach and 
impact of agricultural research. 
It was agreed, as well, that ISNAR was an important link in this process. As the CGIAR- 
NARS relationship deepened, it would be necessary for ISNAR’s responsibilities to be re-examined 
and, if necessary, modified. 
There was no uniformity of views, however, about how precisely the CGIAR-NARS 
relationship should proceed. Some delegates suggested that this was inevitable because there was a 
great diversity among national systems. The most appropriate form of support would therefore vary. 
Moreover, the requirements of NARS, the kinds of strengthening they required, and the most 
appropriate forms of partnership that could be forged between them and the CGIAR could be viewed 
from many different perspectives. 
. 
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Assessments in each of these categories would probably differ, depending on the perspective 
from which they were viewed. Uniformity of approach could remain elusive, as a result. 
Financial arrangements that would be required for CGIAR centres to assist national systems 
were exhaustively discussed. Cautions were expressed against the possibility of international centres 
being turned into agents of bilateral funding institutions. The need to maintain a separation between 
different categories of centre funding figured prominently in the discussion. 
The point was made that while recognizing the absolute necessity to strengthen NARS, 
international centres should remember that their strongest comparative advantage was as a set of 
research centres. 
Responding to the wide range of comments, Mr. McCalla said that there was clear agreement 
on the need for the CGIAR-NARS relationship to be continuously strengthened, but that this should 
be done on a case-by-case basis. 
ISNAR’s role, he said, could be examined in the context of its programme and management 
review. Other issues raised at the discussion would form part of TAC’s next iteration of CGIAR 
priorities and strategies. 
Concluding the discussion, Mr. Thalwitz said that the Group should not consider a lack of 
consensus as failure because there actually was a lot of commonality in what had been said. 
They were all agreed that CGIAR was obliged to strengthen NARS, not out of some moral 
compulsion, but as a matter of pragmatic necessity. 
He suggested that in approaching the question of how to fulfil this obligation, the CGIAR 
should think in terms of criteria, rather than of policies. That was a practical approach, which could 
take account of differences, and ensure that the objectives of CGIAR-NARS collaboration were 
fuElled in different ways, in different contexts. 
